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ABSTRACT
In 1775, the South Carolina Council of Safety and Provincial Congress faced the
tall order of convincing backcountry settlers to join them in overthrowing royal
government. Throughout the backcountry, enthusiasm for independence ran low. The
lack of revolutionary zeal was a consequence of political, economic, and social
differences between the backcountry and the lowcountry. Political power was
concentrated in Charleston and the lowcountry. The backcountry lacked representation in
the colonial Assembly, courts to prosecute criminals, and the Anglican establishment
necessary to establishing a deferential social order. Economically, backcountry farmers
were unable to replicate the rice plantations of the lowcountry. Without profits from a
staple-crop such as rice, an egalitarian social order developed in the backcountry. Certain
historians have argued that the influence of prominent individuals within the
backcountry, who shared economic interests with coastal planters, helped to rally the
backcountry to independence. Without strong political institutions and a staple-crop
economy, deference failed to take root, undermining the arguments of these historians.
In light of the differences between the two regions, revolutionary allegiances were
not forged on a common ideology. How then did the Whig government secure the
backcountry? The answer is two-fold and centers on the issue of protection. While the
Whigs faced open opposition from back-settlers, the backcountry was subdued through
threats of violence. The Council of Safety and Provincial Congress used militia forces to
suppress political dissent in addition to waging economic warfare against those opposed
to the independence movement. Rather than take up arms as active loyalists, most
individuals chose to preserve their property by acquiescing to Whig rule. Whig forces
also benefited from a major strategic blunder on the part of the British. Fear of Indian
attacks ran high in the backcountry, and though the British had no intention of using the
Indians to attack the colony, their actions sparked suspicion. While British intentions
remained unclear to back-settlers, Whig forces sacked the Cherokees in 1776, securing
the allegiance of thousands of back-settlers in the process. In 1780, thousands of backsettlers took up arms under the guard of British troops, reinforcing the notion that
allegiance was based on protection and not political ideology.
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INTRODUCTION

When Thomas Brown regained full consciousness on the evening of August 2,
1775, he probably awoke with a splitting headache. A strong blow from a rifle to the back
of his skull had left Brown semiconscious. Just hours before he had been confronting a
hostile mob from the porch of a plantation house deep within the Georgia backcountry.
The headaches Brown would suffer for the rest of his life were not the only permanent
wound he carried with him as a result of the confrontation. Brow n’s feet had sustained
severe trauma from exposure to a fire, crippling two toes and forcing him to walk with a
limp for several months. Had his hand reached up to touch his head, he would have found
a raw, open wound. If the blow to his head had clouded Brow n’s memory, he may have
assumed that Creek Indians had claimed his scalp; but his legs revealed the true identity
of his assailants. A thick layer of tar caked his lower extremities, the signature
punishment for those who opposed the will of the revolutionary m ob.1
In the aftermath of the attack, Brown fled Georgia for the Ninety-Six district of
the South Carolina backcountry to join forces with prominent loyalists. The angry mob
that appeared at his door demanded that he sign an association swearing allegiance to the

1Edward J. Cashin, The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on
the Southern Frontier (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 27-29. Though
Brown settled in Georgia, he became a staunch loyalist and traveled extensively
throughout South Carolina seeking to rally back-settlers for the Crown. His experience is
similar to those who opposed Whig rule in South Carolina and thus is used as an example
here.
1

Whig government. Brown had arrived in the colony less than a year before the attack, but
he immediately entered a polarized society. As a new immigrant, he lacked the hatred of
British policies that had been brewing for ten years among many colonists. Yet the angry
mob that appeared at his door did not seek conciliatory gestures or afford him the option
of neutrality. He was either with them or against them.
Brown’s mistreatment at the hands of the Whigs spurred him to become a
prominent loyalist leader, the commander of a provincial regiment known as the King’s
Rangers, and Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department late in the war. Though
the abuse Brown received at the hands of the Whigs was uncommon for most
backcountry settlers, each backcountry resident was confronted with a choice: patriot or
loyalist, associator or non-associator; there was no in-between. In the political and social
turbulence of 1775, a year that witnessed the fall of royal government and open conflict
between neighbors throughout South Carolina, the decisions made by tens of thousands
of backcountry settlers determined the fate of the Revolution in South Carolina.
What makes the backcountry settler in South Carolina different from any other
individual in any other colony who would participate in the war? The settlement of the
South Carolina backcountry occurred mere decades before the outbreak of the
Revolution. Though the backcountry was slowly moving towards integration with the
coastal establishment, the war interrupted the process. Economically, politically, and
socially, the backcountry differed from the sophisticated, wealthy, Anglicized society it
bordered. As a result, the Whig government encountered opposition as it attempted to
rally the backcountry to war. Given the lowcountry’s record of political indifference
towards the backcountry and the economic differences between the two regions, many
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men had no desire to exchange a peaceful way of life and recently acquired economic
stability for the havoc brought by war. Local concerns such as preventing the next Indian
attack, getting the next crop to market, and establishing schools dominated the minds of
the back-inhabitants, not abstract issues concerning a Parliament three thousand miles
away.
This description of the backcountry directly challenges that of Rachel Klein, who
downplays the sectional divide between the two regions by attacking the notion of the
backcountry as an egalitarian frontier. According to Klein, the backcountry was not
isolated because a rising planter elite within the backcountry, who wielded a great deal of
power in their localities, shared common economic interests with the planter elite in the
South Carolina lowcountry. W hile the fact that that the vast majority of these rising
planters took up arms for the W higs is well-known, Klein goes further by arguing that
lesser men of property followed their example. Her study, however, exaggerates the
strength of deference in the backcountry and consequently, she gives the rising planter
elite too much agency. In 1775 and 1776, deference had no bearing on the breakdown of
allegiances for the vast majority of the white backcountry population. As mentioned
above, the social, political, and economic conditions within the backcountry served as an
obstacle to revolution. Yet, by the time the Declaration of Independence was signed, the
Whigs controlled the entire province. If individuals did not defer to their Whig-leaning
local leaders, how did the Whig government come to control the backcountry?
The Whig government employed intimidation tactics, threats of physical harm,
the seizure or destruction of property, and economic warfare to neutralize those opposed
to the revolutionary cause and to prevent the wavering from joining the opposition.

3

Violence was necessary because of the lack of ideological unity between the two regions,
a result of differing political, economic, and social conditions. The Whig government
conquered the backcountry in 1775 and early 1776 because the average backcountry
settler sought something that loyalist and British forces could not offer: protection.
Assessing why certain people chose one side over the other uncovers a variety of
motivations, but protection, more than any other factor, allowed the Whigs to gain control
of the backcountry and to neutralize the threat posed by loyalists. Without British troops
to protect them, most backcountry settlers chose the path of least resistance and accepted
Whig rule. When the British invaded in 1780, many of these same settlers would seek
protection from the British army, reinforcing the idea that allegiance was not based on
ideology.
The Whigs were also aided in their efforts by a major strategic error on the part of
the British. While the Whigs attacked the Cherokee Indians in 1776, the bitter enemy of
the backcountry settlers, the British sought to ally with the Cherokees and their Creek
neighbors. Though the British did not intend to employ the Indians in a military
campaign against the Whigs, the fears of back-settlers, who had endured Indian attacks in
the past, compelled them to join the side that provided protection against future attacks.
Assessing the motivation of such an ethnically and religiously diverse population
is no easy task and generalizations pervade the analysis. Such is the nature of the
scholarship on the South Carolina backcountry. Historians have embarked upon
specialized studies due to the ethnic and religious diversity of the region; this study,
however, focuses on a single factor that can bridge these divides. Protection is a basic
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human instinct; ethnic or religious differences have little bearing on the need to secure
life and property.
Regardless of whether the study is a synthesis or highly specialized, both are
plagued with source difficulties. In the aftermath of the war, thousands lay dead, while
thousands of others fled the colony to escape W hig persecution, leaving behind precious
little documentation describing why they remained loyal to the Crown. With their former
enemies gone, the victors wrote a triumphant history of the war, disparaging or excluding
the group that nearly thwarted their cause. The lack of written evidence complicates
efforts to reconstruct the backcountry experience on the eve of Revolution. A definitive,
conclusive answer may never be found. This study seeks to use the preconditions of the
war as a means to infer the motives of individuals in choosing sides. Though no records
exist to shed light on the decision-making process of a backcountry yeoman farmer, a
wealth of information left behind from both Whigs and royal officials exists. When
coupled with knowledge of what backcountry life was like on the eve of Revolution,
these sources can help explain how the W higs won control of the backcountry.
In hindsight, the fate of the Revolution in South Carolina was decided in 1775 and
1776. The fall of royal government and the transition to Whig administration created an
opportunity for loyalists to assert themselves. Loyalist numbers peaked in 1775. By 1780,
when the British attempted a full-scale invasion and occupation of the colony, the Whig
government had rooted out and exiled prominent loyalists such as Thomas Brown. The
rest remained in hiding, afraid to declare their allegiance unless the British offered them
protection. At the front of their minds was an ill-conceived and poorly executed British
expedition in 1776 under the command of Sir Henry Clinton. The rebels thwarted the
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British attack, which bolstered their confidence and struck a blow to loyalist hopes. The
British military offered the only safety from Whig oppression. Had Sir William Howe
sent his army to Charleston instead of New York City in 1776, royal government might
have been restored and back-settlers afforded the protection they sought. Loyalist militias
rose up on their own in 1775 to prevent the entrenchment of Whig authority, but they
would not stand up again unless the British could guarantee protection. When the British
returned in 1780, they once again failed to offer the necessary protection and facilitated a
civil war.
Any study of revolutionary allegiances, regardless of the colony, must examine
the economic, political, and social conditions of the years leading to the Revolution. In
South Carolina, these conditions had a major influence on determining allegiance as the
war approached. Thus, an analysis of backcountry life serves as the point of departure for
this study.

6

CHAPTER I
LIFE IN THE BACKCOUNTRY

Throughout the 18th century, tens of thousands of settlers left their lands in the
backwoods of Pennsylvania to travel south along the Philadelphia Wagon Road in search
of greater economic opportunity. This internal demographic shift, perhaps the largest in
the colonial era, was markedly different from others, however. Though the migrants
originated from a common location, they lacked homogeneity. Germans, Welsh, Scots,
Scots-Irish, Dutch, and Swedes called the frontiers of Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia, home. Ethnic diversity produced a plurality of religious
convictions. Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Nonconformists, and a plethora of other
groups stood in contrast to the Anglicized lowcountry.
In 1952, Carl Bridenbaugh published a series of lectures entitled Myths and
Realities: Societies o f the Colonial South in which he conceived of the backcountry in a
regional sense, declaring it one of three distinct “souths” (the Chesapeake and Carolina
society [South Carolina] comprising the other two). The significance of Bridenbaugh’s
work was his notion that settlement of the southern backcountry was not the product of
east-west migration but rather a north-south pipeline. Consequently, Bridenbaugh argued
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that the backcountry formed a unique cultural identity that differed from the coastal
societies it bordered.2
Though the mere novelty of the backcountry settlements may have produced a
distinct culture, many historians have argued that settlers sought to integrate themselves
into the established coastal societies. However, this integration did not occur
immediately. In 1984, Jack P. Greene proposed a framework designed to analyze the
social development of colonial British America. Greene’s framework serves as a vital
tool in examining the social development of the southern backcountry. Greene proposed
three stages of development: social simplification, social elaboration, and social
replication. By the mid-18th century, coastal societies in Virginia and the Carolinas
managed to replicate British culture. Economic prosperity, a rigid social hierarchy, and a
demand for consumer goods allowed vital southern centers such as W illiamsburg and
Charleston to achieve social replication. The backcountry, however, lagged behind.
Though the backcountry did not develop uniformly along a north-south axis, the youth of
most backcountry settlements has caused numerous historians, among them Richard
Beeman, Rachel Klein, and Richard Brown to describe conditions in line with the
processes of social simplification or social elaboration. Greene described the first stage
of social simplification as:
. . . characterized by much unsettlement and disorientation, as people
sought to find ways to manipulate their new environments for their own
sustenance and advantage while endeavoring, with limited success, to
impose upon that environment social arrangements that, except possibly in

2 Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths and Realties: Societies o f the Colonial South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1952).

the orthodox colonies of Puritan New England, bore little more than a
crude resemblance to those they had left behind.3
Settlers left Pennsylvania in search of more affordable land in greater quantities, but high
mobility, a harsh environment, and dispersed settlements forced them to abandon their
host values in full and adapt to their new surroundings.
As the population grew, as settlements expanded, and as the economy matured,
settlers experienced a process of social elaboration. This phase “involved the articulation
of socioeconomic, political, and cultural institutions, structures, and values that, although
they were usually highly creolized variants of those found in the more developed areas of
Britain, were sufficiently functional to enable local populations to assimilate them with
relatively little difficulty."4 The backcountry, for the most part, did not replicate the
coastal economy, causing back-settlers to create an economy characterized by “highly
creolized variants.” Richard Beeman, in his study Evolution o f the Southern Backcountry:
A Case Study o f Lunenburg County, Virginia, 1746-1832, noted that the quality of soil in
the backcountry prohibited settlers from cultivating the same type of tobacco produced on
tidewater plantations. This lower quality tobacco did not net the same profits as tidewater
tobacco. Other obstacles settlers in the backcountry faced included increased
transportation costs due to geographic barriers, a chronic shortage of white labor given
the wide accessibility of land, and the slow integration of slaves into the backcountry. As
a result, farmers turned to foodstuffs. Consequently, the tobacco production that had

3 Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, eds., Colonial British America: Essays in the New History
o f the Early Modern Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 13.
4 Ibid
9

allowed the tidewater gentry to replicate British behaviors and norms failed to take root
in the backcountry, leaving settlers with a less stratified social structure.5
In South Carolina, the backcountry lacked the rice plantations that had made the
province the wealthiest of all British colonies. Like their counterparts in Virginia, South
Carolina back-settlers had no reliable source of labor. Due to bands of criminals roaming
the countryside during the 1760s, lowcountry merchants refused to sell slaves to
backcountry farmers. Coastal officials did not want criminals, many of whom were
mulatto, to seize possession of slaves or provide safe haven for runaways. In the absence
of a reliable labor source, as in Virginia, most back-settlers turned to foodstuffs. As
George Lloyd Johnson pointed out in his community study of the Upper Pee Dee region,
“wealth was intimately tied to slavery in the South Carolina backcountry.”6 But the
backcountry lacked the number of slaves necessary to produce the wealth that lowcountry
planters enjoyed. Moreover, as T.H. Breen, in an essay in Jack Greene and J.R. Pole’s
Colonial British Am erica: Essays in the New History o f the Early M odem Era, noted,
“Agriculture which was everywhere the occupation of the first settlers, was not enough to
cast them all in one mold, since there are certain types of agriculture [mixed agriculture]
which tend to maintain equal wealth among individuals, and other types [staple
n

agriculture] which tend to destroy it.” Since slaves were in short supply and the land did

5 Richard Beeman, The Evolution o f the Southern Backcountry: A Case Study o f
Lunenburg County, Virginia, 1746-1832 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1984), 33-35.
6 George Lloyd Johnson, The Frontier in the Colonial South: South Carolina
Backcountry, 1736-1800 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 79.
7 T.H. Breen, “Creative Adaptations: People and Cultures,” Chapter 7 in Greene and
Pole, Colonial British Am erica, 213.
10

not support staple agriculture, the South Carolina backcountry economy, like its partner
in Virginia, preserved greater equality among its inhabitants.
The idea of backcountry society copying the norms of the coastal establishment is
found in a seminal study of the South Carolina backcountry: Rachel Klein’s Unification
o f a Slave State: The Rise o f a Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 17601808. Klein questions the credit cotton has received for unifying South Carolina in the
aftermath of the Revolution. Instead, she posits that the framework for integration existed
in the backcountry in the form of a rising elite who shared common economic interests
with coastal planters. Fundamental to Klein’s argument is her conception of the nature of
authority in the backcountry. She asserts that the rising elite were “men of influence” in
o

their respective regions due to their economic clout and political authority. As
storeowners, speculators, mill operators, militia officers, and justices of the peace, this
small portion of the population established themselves as leaders of backcountry society.
Rebuking Frederick Jackson Turner’s vision of the frontier as egalitarian and anti
authoritarian, Klein portrays a backcountry moving towards a stratified social order. Her
examination of the Regulator M ovement promotes this point.
In the wake of the devastation wrought by the Cherokee W ar of 1759-1761, bands
of criminals targeted back-settlers, rendering the economy unstable and property unsafe.
Without any courts in the backcountry, any criminal arrested had to be brought to
Charleston; but the difficulty of traveling to the coast allowed criminals to escape justice.
When the colonial assembly refused to take action, men throughout the backcountry
started a vigilante movement to bring these criminals to justice. Though many historians

8 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 84-85.
11

have viewed the Regulator Movement as proof of a sectional divide between the
backcountry and lowcountry, Klein rejects this notion. She asserts that coastal leaders
sympathized with Regulator demands for courts and other government institutions, but
that colonial protests against the Stamp Act and other parliamentary efforts to tax the
colonies prevented the assembly from taking action. Klein points to a fundamental social
problem in the backcountry between two groups: hunters and planters. While planters
sought to establish property rights and establish markets for their goods, hunters lived as
nomads, killing cattle and squatting on land, including Indian lands which exposed the
entire backcountry to attack. Since most hunters became criminals, the Regulators acted
not only to petition the Assembly for courts and other government institutions but also to
correct “a fundamental social disunity.” 9 South Carolina was one of few colonies that
lacked a vagrancy law. Moreover, the lack of government institutions allowed acts of
drunkenness, sexual impropriety, and other forms of immorality to go unpunished. In
response, the Regulators captured and whipped the poor and indigent, an act that Klein
views as establishing a particular type of social order in line with the interests of the
rising elite.
Klein’s study is significant in discussing the Revolution because she asserts that
the influence and authority the rising elite held in their respective regions determined the
breakdown of allegiances. Since only 6 of 120 leading Regulators were active loyalists,
Klein posits that these “men of influence” deserve credit for helping to secure the
backcountry for the Whigs. Klein’s argument that the rising elite shared a common
economic interest with coastal planters is correct. However, Klein grants too much

9 Richard Maxwell Brown, The South Carolina Regulators (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of the Harvard University Press, 1963), 24.
12

agency to the rising elite. As Ronald Hoffman noted, “The incompatibly of two major
values, equality and deference, which had been developing during the colonial era,
reached the point of crucial confrontation during the Revolution.” 10 For Klein to assert
that deference trumped equality is to brush aside notions of independence and authority
found in other works that undermine her argument.
In an introductory essay to a collection of essays on the backcountry during the
American Revolution, Jack Greene submitted a framework for understanding the
backcountry by addressing the issues of independence, improvement, and authority.
Greene argued that widespread independence existed in the American colonies due to
extensive opportunities for landownership. Green defines independence as “freedom from
the will of others. . . a sovereignty of self in all public and private relations.” 11 “No social
excuse” for failure existed given the opportunities for success. In order to enjoy their
independence to the fullest extent, Greene argued settlers worked to improve their
societies. Improvement did not involve the creation of a brand new society; rather,
settlers looked east to recreate British society through social simplification, elaboration,
and replication. Fundamental to Greene’s notion of improvement is the desire of
independent men to exploit other men by making them their dependents and to create a
deferential social order. 12

10Ronald Hoffman, “The ‘Disaffected’ in the Revolutionary South,” in Alfred F. Young
ed., The American Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism
(Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), 300.
" Ibid., 12.
I
~ Jack P. Greene, ” Independence, Improvement, and Authority: Towards a Framework
for Understanding the Histories' of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the
American Revolution,” in Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., An
Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 13.
13

Though Greene emphasized the desire of each new society to build a social
hierarchy, he questioned the strength of such models. Despite the move towards a society
based on concepts of hierarchy and deference, authority within the backcountry and the
colonies at large remained fragile. Opportunities for land ownership reduced dependence.
Deference no longer served as an instrument of social control as economic opportunities
narrowed the gap between elites and non-elites. Political figureheads were empowered
through “passive noninterest.” Greene argued that individuals came to America seeking
freedom to pursue their private interests, not to meddle in public affairs, and relinquished
their right to pursue public office. Thus, elites governed by default. When individuals did
take action and defy authority, they did so in defense of their independence. ] 3
Greene’s notions of widespread independence and weak authority challenges
K lein’s notion that the elite men of the backcountry wielded enough personal and
political clout to secure the backcountry for the Whigs. Klein correctly declares that the
backcountry sought to replicate lowcountry norms. The Regulator Movement, in her
eyes, was a plea for structure and authority based on the stratified social order of
lowcountry society. Greene admitted, however, that independence weakened deferential
authority. Although men sought to exploit each other and to create a deferential order
based on dependency, they could not because backcountry conditions created a society
where men achieved “freedom from the will of others.”
Three-fourths of South Carolina’s white population resided beyond the piedmont,
yet Klein gives agency only to a minority. K lein’s neglect of the non-elite within the
backcountry clashes with G reene’s contention of widespread independence. Klein holds

13 Ibid., 22-36.
14

to Richard Brow n’s assertion in The South Carolina Regulators that the Regulator
movement was designed to create a specific social order in line with the interests of the
planter class; in doing so, she rejects the notion that the Regulator movement was a
popular movement. Yet, in her own work, Klein cited a comment from an observer of
Regulator activity: “Every Man of Property is a Regulator at Heart.” 14 Such a statement
suggests the backcountry movement was more than the handiwork of the rising elite,
given the widespread diffusion of property. Because a majority of back-settlers wanted
their private property secured and civil order restored, Klein exaggerates the authority of
the rising elite.
Moreover, despite Klein’s contention that the backcountry desired slaves, one
particular event (which she omits from her analysis) during the Regulator movement
threatened to shatter white unity in a colony highly susceptible to slave insurrection. A
tense encounter between the Regulators and an armed force dispatched by the colonial
governor nearly led to an invasion of the lowcountry by the Regulators. The severity of
the encounter was best described by Charles Woodmason, an Anglican itinerant and
Regulator spokesman, who wrote, “The People were about to march downward and
destroy all the Plantations of those Gentlemen whom they thought in the Plot - And it
was with difficulty they were restrain’d” 15 The interests of the backcountry and
lowcountry did not seem to align in this instance, despite Klein’s assertion that the

14 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 61.
15 Richard J. Hooker, ed., The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve o f the Revolution: The
Journal ancl Other Writings o f Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and
Culture, 1953), 181-83.
15

coastal establishment sympathized with Regulator demands and the elite shared common
interests.
Another work that challenges K lein’s thesis is Wayne Lee’s Crowds and Soldiers
in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture o f Violence in Riot and War. Lee examines
the use of violence as a means of political protest, which has traditionally been viewed by
historians as a rejection of authority and challenge to the social order. Lee rejects this
view, arguing that violence was a means of communication for those alienated from the
formal political process; he posits that rioters were restrained by the need to appear
legitimate to the larger popular com munity.16 According to Lee, “Rioters patterned their
behavior in order to emphasize the legitimacy of their actions, and the need to appear
legitimate arose from the simple fact that the tool of the rioter was violence, with all its
implications of threatening the social order.” 17 Lee’s analysis of the North Carolina
Regulators demonstrates the power of public opinion. The Regulators did not turn to
armed conflict when they had a grievance; they followed a path of legal recourse before
taking up arms. But even when they did resort to violence, their actions were restrained.
When they besieged the Hillsborough courthouse, the act that provided the impetus for
Governor Tyron to attack the Regulators, they chose their targets carefully. In an earlier
confrontation, Governor Tyron refrained from attacking the Regulators, recognizing that
the public would not consider his use of violence to be politically legitimate. Lee’s study
exposed the authority each individual held in determining what was politically legitimate.

16 Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture o f
Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 7, 43.
17 Ibid., 2-3.
16

When Lee’s study of violence and political legitimacy is applied to South
Carolina, the idea of a rising elite embodying authority in the backcountry continues to
fall apart. The Regulators encountered opposition through their use of violence, but this
opposition came from within the backcountry rather than from the socially mature
lowcountry. Citizens objected to the beatings and whippings used by Regulators to root
out the indigent and correct the social ills of backcountry society. The Moderators, who
Regulator expert Richard Brown claimed were more numerous than historians have
acknowledged, openly opposed these Regulator methods and, as a result, brought an end
to the Regulator movement. 18 Klein dismisses the Moderators as belonging to the lower
echelons of society and opposed to the goals of the rising elite. But the rise of the
Moderators revealed that the Regulators lacked political legitimacy in their use of
violence and individuals possessed the authority necessary to stop them. Though Klein
extols the influence and clout of the rising elite, the power to determine what was
politically legitimate was rooted in widespread independence and an aversion to a
deferential order.
Klein’s depiction of the Moderators as belonging to the lower echelons of society
points to a larger issue of class conflict. She argued that, “Conflict within the
Revolutionary backcountry may not have been a class struggle in any simple sense, but it
did have an important class dimension.” 19 Klein asserts that this class dimension was
visible in the clash of interests between Regulator planters and the indigent hunters
whose behavior they sought to correct. However, such a statement imposes far too much
economic homogeneity on both Whigs and loyalists. As Robert Lambert noted in the only

18 Brown, South Carolina Regulators, chapter 6.
19 Klein, Unification o f a Slave State, 81.
17

published study of loyalists in South Carolina, the large loyalist army captured by the
Whigs in late 1775 was economically diverse. The force consisted of men owning
anywhere from 100 to 1,500 acres. While some produced substantial amounts of grain,
indigo, and livestock with slave labor, others cleared only enough land to subsist without
the help of negroes.20 Both hunters and men of prominence in the backcountry opposed
the Whigs.
Economics forms the crux of Richard Beeman’s argument, another historian
whose study of the Virginia backcountry implicitly challenges Klein’s findings. Beeman,
like Klein, acknowledges the existence of elite individuals in Lunenburg County, but he
chronicles the conditions that prevented them from establishing a deferential society,
conditions not unlike those in South Carolina. Beeman drew a line between personal
authority and political authority. Whereas tidewater planters amassed a fortune through
tobacco cultivation and land speculation that served as a means of persuasion and
influence, the local elite in Lunenburg County lacked the personal wealth and influence
9|

necessary to command respect from their peers. " Additionally, the elite opted to forgo
luxury goods in favor of using that money to purchase slaves; thus, they lacked the
79
consumer goods so crucial in denoting gentility."" The economic shortcomings of the
local elite were exposed by Glasglow merchants who provided credit to small farmers
77
when the local elite came up short." Despite a large influx of slaves in the 1750s and
1760s, a social hierarchy failed to form. During the economic growth of those decades,
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the poor enjoyed an increase in overall land ownership and more yeoman farmers owned
slaves in Lunenburg County than in any tidewater county.24 In general, a higher standard
of living resulted for all residents. W ithout personal authority, these elite men were
unable to effectively exercise their authority as officeholders. The widespread
independence Greene proposed as a framework certainly applied to Lunenburg County,
Virginia, economically as well as politically. Contested elections and massive “treating”
of the masses exposed the lack of a deferential order.25
The backcountries in the various colonies did not achieve the same economic
prosperity as the coastal societies they neighbored. Consequently, as Beeman noted, the
rising elite failed to differentiate themselves from the yeoman majority and to command
their respect as figures of authority. The presence of criminals throughout the 1760s
hindered the spread of slavery into the South Carolina backcountry, the cornerstone upon
which the stratified social order in the lowcountry was built. In the absence of a reliable
labor source back-settlers turned to foodstuffs. The staple crops that had enriched the
coastal elite were not easily transplanted to the backcountry. Consequently, the local elite
lacked the personal wealth that was necessary to wield personal authority. Even though
the local elite held positions of political power, their lack of wealth undermined their
formal authority due to a narrow economic gap between elite and yeoman farmers.
The failure to unify the backcountry economically with the lowcountry stemmed
from the differing stages of development that Greene outlined. The backcountry lagged
behind the established coastal societies because settlement had occurred towards the end
of the colonial era; though the backcountry was making strides, its progress was

24 Ibid., 66-67.
25 Ibid., 9J-95.
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interrupted by the Revolution. Two regions at two different stages of development
consequently produced conflicting interests. Ronald Hoffman provided an example of
this conflict. Wheat cultivation in the Carolina piedmont had produced economic
prosperity but it was threatened by colonial protests such as the Continental Association,
which prohibited the exportation of all agricultural goods to Britain, except rice. The
Continental Association demanded that farmers give up their prosperity for abstract
principles. The back-settlers opposed participation; as Hoffman stated, “they were not
given to concerns about individual liberties and natural rights. What they wanted most
seemed little enough: modest good fortune and some security in their lives.”26 The
Continental Association, a creation of coastal planters and merchants, was not in the best
interest of back-settlers, and they did not abide by the agreement out of deference to their
political leaders. As Hoffman noted:
The incompatibly of two major values, equality and deference, which had
been developing during the colonial era, reached the point of crucial
confrontation during the Revolution. Consequently, when the
revolutionary leadership placed heavy demands on the people - demands
in many ways more oppressive than the comparatively mild tyranny of
Parliament - many men, especially those with limited involvement in their
97
political culture, resented and resisted them."
Jack Greene asserted that widespread independence weakened authority. Men preferred
to pursue their private interests rather than meddle in public affairs. However, the
Revolution created a situation where private interests clashed with public affairs.
Consequently, individuals prioritized their local concerns at the expense of the greater
good.28 Because the rising elite, whose interests paralleled the coastal elite more so than
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their yeoman neighbors, did not exercise strong authority, local concerns dominated
backcountry politics.
When evidence of economic differences, widespread independence, and weak
authority within the backcountry are taken as a whole, the coastal governments faced a
daunting task in galvanizing support for the revolutionary cause. Though Klein is right to
challenge her predecessors’ notion of a staunch sectional divide between the backcountry
and the lowcountry on the basis of the Regulator Movement, her explanation for how the
Whigs gained control of the backcountry is insufficient given evidence provided by other
historians and weaknesses within her own argument. Ties between the two regions were
not strong enough to produce unity based on a shared ideology of self-rule and
republicanism. Rev. Charles Woodmason demonstrated the ease with which back-settlers
could turn the same republican rhetoric coastal leaders were using against Parliament on
their own colonial government when he wrote: “We are Free-Men - British Subjects Not Born Slaves - We contribute our Proportion in all Public Taxations, and discharge
our Duty to the Public, equally with our Fellow Provincials Ye[t] We do not participate
with them in the Rights and Benefits which they Enjoy, tho’ equally Entituled to them.

29

The legacy of the Regulator Movement created bitterness in the backcountry, but
historians have overstated the importance of this movement in creating antagonism to the
independence movement. The wider picture of economic, political, and social
development serves as a more convincing answer to the question of why the South
Carolina backcountry produced such opposition to the patriot cause. The question that
remains to be answered is what Whig forces planned to do about this opposition.
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CHAPTER II
INTIMIDATION

In June 1775, the South Carolina Council of Safety, one of two extralegal political
organizations developed by the Whigs, dispatched a three-man committee into the
backcountry to “explain to the people at large the nature of the unhappy disputes between
Great Britain and the American Colonies.”30 The three-man committee was made up of
W illiam Henry Drayton, a prominent politician and arguably South Carolina’s most
vehement patriot, the Rev. W illiam Tennent, head of the Independent (Presbyterian)
Church of Charleston, and the Rev. Oliver Hart, a Baptist minister of humble roots.
Given the isolation of the backcountry from colonial protests, the mission of these three
men was to take ten years of revolutionary fervor and convey it to the backcountry in two
months. Words of persuasion failed early and often, and the committee, spearheaded by
Drayton, turned to intimidation in order to overcome the differences between the regions.
Enthusiasm for the Whigs ran low in the backcountry. One month into the
mission, Tennent wrote to Henry Laurens, “They [back-settlers] firmly believe that no

30 Order of Council of Safety, July 23, 1775, in R.W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History
o f the American Revolution: Consisting o f Letters and Papers Relating to the Contest fo r
Liberty, Chiefly in South Carolina, in the Possession o f the Editor, and Other Sources,
Vols 1-3 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1855), 1:106. NOTE: Any further citations
refer to volume one unless otherwise noted.
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man that comes from below, and that no paper printed there can speak the truth.”31 Oliver
Hart recorded in his diary that “Some of the neighbors came to see us, with whom we had
much Conversation about the present State of the Times; found them so fixed on the Side
of the Ministry, that no argument on the contrary Side seemed to have any weight with
them; they generally acknowledge that they know but little about the Matter, and yet are
fixed.”32 A pamphlet circulating throughout the backcountry entitled An Address o f the
People o f Great Britain to the Inhabitants o f America, reminded the back-settlers that “It
is hard that the charge of our intending to enslave you should come oftenest from the
mouths of those lawyers who in your southern provinces at least, have long made you
slaves to themselves.”33
W illiam Henry Drayton, with his fiery oratorical skills, sought to overcome the
ignorance of the back-settlers that Hart spoke of and to educate them on the matter of
revolution. But D rayton’s use of rhetoric fell on deaf ears. His advocacy of
republicanism had little effect on men who were underrepresented in the Assembly. The
Whigs had their work cut out for them. The nature of the opposition was best exemplified
by one back-settler who expressed a desire to see one thousand Bostonians killed in
battle.34 Given the challenges before him, Drayton thought it necessary to carry a pair of
pistols and a sword at all times. '
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On numerous occasions, Drayton and Tennent ordered residents of towns to
assemble only to have no one show up, or if they did, they often refused to sign the
Association. At a Dutch Church, Drayton gave a speech to a group of ethnic Germans,
but not one of them stepped forward to sign the Association. Thomas Fletchall, an
influential militia colonel, on orders from the Council of Safety, mustered his regiment
and read them the Association. When his men refused to sign it, Fletchall reported, “it
ozr _

was out of my power to compel them to.”'

The early opposition Drayton encountered

surely wounded his pride. Drayton was not humble about his rhetorical skills. During one
discourse he proclaimed, “the falling tears from the audience showed that their hearts
were penetrated, and that we might hope for success.’07 But D rayton’s faith in the power
of his rhetoric is hard to reconcile with accusations of a prominent loyalist that Drayton
intentionally returned lists of associators containing duplicate names to the Provincial
Congress.38
Drayton’s words of persuasion did not resonate with the diverse backcountry
population. His task was to find some way, as Fletchall said, to “compel them.” The
Provincial Congress in June 1775 passed measures designed to polarize society. The
Congress resolved that “any person having violated or refused obedience to the authority
of the Provincial Congress, shall. . . be questioned. . . and upon due conviction of either
of the offenses aforesaid, and continuing contumacious, such person shall. . . be declared
and advertised, as an enemy to the Liberties of America, and an object fo r the resentment
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o f the public. . . .”39 The Provincial Congress could advertise the names of those enemies
of liberty all it wanted, but without some means of enforcement, the resolution was
nothing more than empty rhetoric.
The W higs found a solution in economic warfare. The Council of Safety
attempted to marginalize those in opposition to independence by limiting trade
opportunities and cutting off access to essential commercial services. W hile promoting
the revolutionary cause to a Dutch audience during his backcountry tour, Drayton
declared that “no non-subscriber in this settlement will be allowed to purchase at, or sell
to this store of Charles Town.”40 A few days later, Drayton addressed another group of
Dutchmen, yet they refused to sign the Association. In response, Drayton decreed, “no
miller, who was a subscriber, should grind wheat or corn for any person who was a
nonsubscriber.” According to Drayton, “This gave an immediate shock and has given a
general alarm among the Dutch, from which. . . I expect a desirable effect.”41 Millers and
blacksmiths refused to serve those who joined the enemy.

42

Governor W illiam Campbell

bemoaned the treatment of non-associators when he wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth:
For their attachment to their King and the constitution of their country,
they are cut off from the only mart they had for their little produce and
from the only place where they could supply their necessities. Salt, that
most necessary article to their very existence, they are totally deprived of,
which will render it impossible for them to preserve their winter
provisions; they can neither have ammunition to defend themselves nor
clothes to cover them.43
TO
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Scottish Highlanders were afraid to take up arms against the Whigs for fear of having
their property seized. W hile the Highlanders would not be active Whigs, more
importantly, they were not active supporters of the Crown.44
The Council of Safety recognized the need to draw economic battle lines and to
preserve certain privileges for those friendly to the independence movement, lest these
individuals jum p ship. Drayton reported to the Council of Safety, “I have to assure you
that unless our friends in the country find that the non-subscribers are debarred all
communication with Charles Town and all trade with the country stores, they will be
much chagrined; and bad consequences may ensure.”45 In order to ensure that nonassociators were economically marginalized, Drayton ordered a guard of troops to be
placed near the western entrances of Charleston to check whether those bringing wagons
and trade goods to the city had signed the Association 46
* * * * *

* * * *

Economic warfare may have spurred many potential loyalists to sign the
Association, but a greater threat to the revolutionary cause came from the presence of
royal officials. So long as the royal government existed in the colony, the non-associators
felt protected. Gov. William Campbell had written numerous pamphlets to the
backcountry from Charleston criticizing Whig actions and emphasizing the sectional
divide. Drayton acknowledged the threat the governor posed:
He animates these men - he tempts them - and although they are now
recovered, yet their fidelity is precarious, if he is at liberty to job them
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again, and lay new toils for them. Gentlemen, allow me, in the strongest
terms, to recommend that you make hostages of the Governor and the
officers.47
By September 1775, Drayton and the W higs earned a major victory when the governor
fled to a British warship in Charleston Harbor, ending royal authority and allowing the
Whigs to govern without formal opposition.
At the heart of the need to topple royal government was the issue of authority, an
issue that had special meaning for the backcountry. Authority, as suggested by the lack of
formal institutions and widespread independence in the backcountry, was never as strong
as it was in the lowcountry. The average backcountry farmer went about their day-to-day
tasks without feeling the pressing hand of government due to the lack of courts, schools,
and Anglican churches. Furthermore, the lack of political integration also contributed to
the emphasis on local concerns at the expense of provincial needs. Thus, the backcountry
was not beholden to the Council of Safety or to the Provincial Congress. After all, the
Council of Safety was comprised of thirteen men, eight of whom resided in Charleston
and the remaining five came from the surrounding lowcountry.

4 o

The backcountry had no

representation; given the fact that three-fourths of South Carolina’s white inhabitants
resided in the backcountry, the actions of the Council of Safety was the handiwork of a
minority. The only way to compel men to join the Whig cause was by bringing a greater
degree of authority to the backcountry through the use of the militia. The militia
represented the hand of authority in an area long devoid of government institutions; it
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carried out the will of the W hig government and suppressed political dissent 49 D rayton’s
words of persuasion had failed to sway a region not interested in Revolution. Even he
recognized the need for new methods when he wrote to the Council of Safety, “vigorous
measures are absolutely necessary. . . In giving you this information, I tell a melancholy
truth; but I do my duty. ”50
Using threats of physical violence to influence political allegiance was not a tactic
created as a result of the backcountry challenge. Physical intimidation was used long
before the militia marched to the backcountry in the form of the Charleston mob. As the
fourth-largest city in the American colonies and, like any city, a hotbed of merchants,
Charleston housed a high concentration of individuals opposed to independence.
Although one observer noted that “great numbers” opposed subscribing their names to
“so treasonable an engagement. . . few dared refuse,” for fear of retribution from “the
fury of a desperate and vindictive mob.”51 The urban mob was responsible for helping to
make Charleston safe for W hig government and allowed the revolutionaries to turn their
attention to the backcountry.
The Council of Safety and Provincial Congress moved quickly and discreetly to
organize a militia. In early June, the Provincial Congress proposed raising two regiments
of infantry of 750 men each and a cavalry regiment of 500; in order to fund the militia,
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the Congress issued 150,000 pounds of paper money.52 While these new forces were
raised initially with the purpose of defending against a slave revolt, Drayton traveled
throughout the backcountry and, when his rhetoric failed, made threats that these new,
loyal regiments were capable of carrying out.
The formation of a Whig militia not only offered a way to carry out the wishes of
the W hig government, it provided opposition to loyalist forces in the region. Armed
skirmishes were few and far between; both sides relied on posturing and a show of force
rather than an actual shooting war to intimidate undecided parties into joining or
preventing them from supporting the opposition. The W higs’ ability to attract greater
numbers ultimately contributed to their victory. Drayton observed that “the whole
country, that is the K ing’s men as they are called, were terrified by the march and the
cannon” as he traveled with the militia between towns. In another observation Drayton
proclaimed, “it is plain their [loyalist] influence is declining, and that their people are
terrified. And this last, I assure you, is a fact. They never dreamed we would take the
53
field; they thought their boast of 4,000 would ensure their security against us.”"
Drayton used the militia to make examples of those who openly opposed the
Whig government. Moses Kirkland, a former Regulator, served as a W hig militia officer
but switched sides when he was passed over for a promotion. Drayton ordered his
plantation ransacked; five thousand weight of indigo was destroyed and sixty slaves were
confiscated.54 Drayton also issued a declaration declaring that “all such persons as,
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without lawful authority, shall assemble in arms, in company with, or by instigation of
the said Moses Kirkland, will be deemed public enemies to be suppressed by the sword
[my emphasis].”55 The edict “so terrified Kirkland’s followers, that now he is in a manner
alone, and having tried every effort to procure assistance on the south side of Saluda in
vain, he is now invisible - is never two hours in a place, and he never sleeps in a
house.”56
Drayton did not confine the threats to men of influence like Kirkland. In
September 1775, in the most western area of South Carolina, the Ninety-Six district, a
confrontation ensued between loyalist and patriot forces. Drayton marched into the town
of Ninety-Six and ordered the militia to muster. Under a newly ratified provincial law, he
punished those who refused. He declared, “I shall march and attack, as public enemies,
all and every person in arms, or to be in arms, in this part of the Colony, in opposition to
the measures of Congress.”

S7

He made good on his threat by dispatching parties with

orders to “rifle houses break locks and seize the papers of those who had opposed the
Designs of Congress.”

CO

Because of Drayton’s tactics, Thomas Fletchall, who lived in the

Ninety-Six district, was “so struck with terror” that the “poor Bastard . . . went so far as
to acquaint Drayton that it was his opinion that we [loyalists] should submit to any
terms.”59 Days after the confrontation, a treaty was signed between the Whig government
and the people of Ninety-Six. So long as the people of the district “shall choose to behave
peaceably,” they were permitted to keep their property. The subsequent peace speaks
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volumes about the nature of the opposition to the Whigs. W hen confronted with direct
force, the back-settlers of the Ninety-Six district chose to acquiesce to Whig authority in
order to pursue their private ends. W hile in the peace accord they affirmed their desire to
remain a part of the British empire, they also promised not to support British troops in the
event of an invasion.60 Political ideology played very little role in determining allegiance.
Drayton’s intimidation tactics at Ninety-Six sidelined hundreds, if not thousands, of
potential loyalists.
The polarizing tactics of the W hig leadership quickly penetrated down through
the ranks of the militia. Col. William Thomson, a militia commander, wrote to Henry
Laurens boasting that his men were beginning to “observe that those who are not for
America, are undoubtedly against it. Such discourses we hear spreading through our
camps, and I have reason to believe is their determination.” He expressed hope that by
“putting militia law in force against the defaulters,” loyalist efforts would fail. 61
Though Drayton and the Whigs did implement “militia law” and punish those
who opposed them, Drayton also bluffed to scare people into submission. Thomas Brown
intercepted a letter en route from Drayton to Whig colonel Richard Richardson. The letter
contained instructions to Richardson to raise a party of men to join those already under
Drayton’s command in ransacking and burning the plantations of non-associators.62
Drayton had sent the letter intending for it to be intercepted by the loyalists.
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Drayton did not want to shed blood. He recognized that violence would have “laid
the foundation for lasting animosities.”63 In addition, Whig victory was not guaranteed if
the two forces came to battle. W hile besieged at Ninety-Six in November 1775, the
commanding officer, M ajor Andrew W illiamson, wrote to Drayton that W hig forces were
very weak, possessing only thirty pounds of gunpowder.64 Although the siege ended in a
truce with minor bloodshed, prospects had looked bleak for the Whigs.
By December of 1775, the Whigs had solidified their authority in the
backcountry. In late November, Col. Richardson rounded up his Camden-based militia
and set out to crush their loyalist foes. The ensuing “Snow Campaign” (named for the
fluke snow storm that coated South Carolina that month) eradicated loyalist forces and
took 136 of their leaders prisoners. Richardson had amassed an impressive force that was
surely an intimidating sight. The 4,000 - 5,000 men under his command had a grave
effect on loyalist efforts:
The number has a good effect, strikes terror, and shows what can be done
on occasion. . . . we have been successful in disarming most of the
unhappy people; they are coming in with fear and trembling, giving up
their arms, with a sensible contrition for the errors they have been guilty
of. The spirit of discord being much abated, most of the [loyalist] Captains
have come in, and good part of the companies under them.65
Drayton and the Whig militias had invoked aggressive tactics to suppress those
who posed a threat to W hig authority. Such policies nearly worked against the Whigs,
however. During one of his discourses to a group of Germans, the settlers “were so
possessed with an idea, that the rangers were posted here to force their signatures to the
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association, that they would not by any arguments be induced to come near us.”66 Edward
Musgrove, a prominent backcountry planter, chastised Drayton: “The great inadvertency
of some of the backwoods committee, who should keep from letting out some foolish
speeches to scare the people into their measures, which effects quite the other way rather exasperates than frightens.”

Thomas Brown wrote that Drayton’s “acts of

violence so incensed our People” that he and Cunningham assembled 1,200 men in five
days and nearly drove Fletchall, who was reluctant to confront the Whigs, out of camp.
Fear of alienating the population was visible in the opposition Drayton’s proposal to
capture twelve key loyalist leaders met in the Council of Safety. The resolution passed by
a 4-3 decision.68 During the second session of the Provincial Congress, the Rev. William
Tennent had served on a committee that drew up the Association he and Drayton were
circulating. Henry Laurens, president of the Provincial Congress, believed that a clause
labeling non-associators “inimical to the Liberty of the Colonies” was too harsh; he
clashed with Tennent, who insisted on leaving it in.69
Despite the concerns over alienating back-settlers through intimidation and harsh
language, Drayton and the Whig leadership managed to walk a fine line between acts of
terrorism and acts of necessity. In the aftermath of the Snow Campaign, the Whig
government granted widespread pardons to those who had taken up arms in the name of
the king. Richardson noted that:
The people are now more convinced than ever of their being wrong. The
lenitive measures have had a good effect; the spirit and power is gone
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from them and I am sure (if not interrupted by designing men on our side)
that country, which I had it in my power to lay waste (and which the
people expected), will be happy, and peace and tranquility take place of
ruin and discord - a wished for event.70
Those who had taken up arms against the Whigs quickly changed their minds. The
majority of non-associators who surrendered during the Snow Campaign became
“sensible of their error” and went home denouncing those leaders who had misled them
about the “nature of the present contest.”71 Such action reinforces the idea that
allegiances were seldom ideologically based, but more the result of which side offered
the best protection.
The W hig government also worked to solidify its own authority by granting
leniency to its former enemies. The Provincial Congress passed a resolution restoring the
right to trade to those former non-associators, with the exception of arms and
ammunition, which would only be returned by swearing an oath of loyalty. The Congress
also resolved “That the respective Committees and supporters of the American cause,
ought to discourage the use of any opprobrious language, reflecting upon the late
misbehaviour of the aforesaid insurgents, who, behaving in a peaceable manner, ought to
be treated with friendship and humanity, tenderness and moderation, as the Congress
wishes to reclaim rather than to punish.”72
The W higs also made major political concessions. When formed the Provincial
Congress was formed in June 1775, it dramatically increased the representation of the
backcountry, though it still remained disproportional given its advantage in population.
The backcountry was allocated only 3 of 30 seats in the colonial Assembly, but in the
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new Provincial Congress, it garnered 55 of 187 seats.73 Following the Declaration of
Independence, the new Assembly formed under the South Carolina state constitution
disestablished the Anglican Church, a major concession to the evangelical groups that
dominated the backcountry.74 Such concessions worked to preserve the peace won largely
through intimidation.
************
The differing interests of yeoman farmers and the militant coastal leaders had
caused the backcountry to react to Drayton and Tennent’s tour with ambivalence. W hile
some men felt so bitter towards the coastal elite that they took up arms in defense of royal
government, the ambivalence most back-settlers displayed towards the impending
revolution revealed that the vast majority of backcountry settlers wanted to be left to their
private pursuits. However, the Whigs knew the danger of allowing loyalist militias to
remain among the back-settlers. If the British invaded the colony, the Whigs faced a
potential two-front war. Thus, the backcountry threat had to be neutralized. The Snow
Campaign marked a watershed moment in the struggle for the backcountry. Loyalist
militias were finally neutralized three months after the fall of royal government; the
W higs enjoyed uncontested rule by December 1775.
Despite their best efforts, loyalist militias failed to amass in numbers equal to the
Whigs. As a result, men defected, unwilling to stand up against a numerically superior
enemy. The events of 1775 brought a previously unknown degree of authority to the
backcountry. M ost men, because they were unwilling to risk their lives and property in
opposing the Whigs, gravitated to the side that offered the most protection. In July 1775,
7
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loyalist forces threatened W hig authority in the backcountry, but by December the Whig
government conducted business without opposition. By exiling Gov. William Campbell
to Charleston Harbor, the W higs, through the Council of Safety and Provincial Congress,
gained control of the militia structure. Those opposed to the conduct of the Whigs were
purged from the militia and their access to the supplies needed to challenge the Whigs
was restricted, thereby putting loyalists on the defensive. Historian Don Higginbotham
concisely articulated the importance of the militia to suppressing loyalist opposition when
he wrote, ‘T h e m ilitia’s use of muscle guaranteed that the patriots would maintain control
of the political and law enforcing machinery in every colony. Therefore, from a military
point of view, [the] months [following Lexington and Concord] were quite likely the
most crucial period of the Revolution.”75
But the suppression of dissent in the backcountry was not solely a consequence of
the fall of royal government and patriot seizure of the reins of authority. Whig success
owed a great deal to the nature of opposition. Those who took up arms against the Whigs
may have had an ideological attachment to the crown; but when confronted with a
numerically superior force, they laid down their arms and promised to live in peace under
W hig rule, bringing into question the strength of their ideology. Others never even took
up arms. In light of D rayton’s threats of seizure of property, incarceration, and economic
marginalization, many back-settlers - whose exact numbers we will never know acquiesced to Whig rule. Becoming a loyalist meant taking up arms against another
armed body, without the protection of British troops. Becoming a Whig required an
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individual to perform militia duty, but with the support of the established authority and
the security of superior numbers. In light of Whig ascendancy to power and use of
intimidation tactics, for the average back-settler looking to continue his pre-war life, the
Whigs offered a greater chance to pursue the status quo. Robert Cunningham, in a critical
letter to Drayton, best emphasized the value back-settlers placed on protection and why
the Whigs emerged from 1775 with a firm grip on the backcountry: “I expected you
would have acted with more honor than taken the advantage of men (as I believe) half
scared out of their senses at the sight of liberty caps and sound of cannon, as seeing and
hearing has generally more influence on some men than reason.”76
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CHAPTER III
THE INDIAN THREAT

The Whigs overcame the economic, political, and social differences between the
backcountry and lowcountry that had produced conflicting interests and successfully
subdued the backcountry largely through intimidation. But they did not win control of the
backcountry on this issue alone. Though war with Britain may not have advanced the
plight or status of the back-settlers, the Whigs were able to represent the best interests of
the settlers by addressing a chronic backcountry problem: Indians. The close proximity of
Indian nations bred constant fear among those living beyond the Piedmont. The scars of
the Cherokee war of 1759-1761 ran deep; settlers demanded protection. The need to
neutralize the Indian threat became a pivotal issue in determining the allegiance of the
backcountry.
On May 3, 1775, a letter arrived in Charleston from Arthur Lee, a patriot who had
been dispatched to London as a representative from Boston. The letter stated that “there
is gone down to sheerness, seventy-eight thousand guns and bayonets to be sent to
America to be put into the hands of N***** [negroes], the Roman Catholics, the Indians,
and the Canadians; and all the. . . means on earth used to subdue the colonies.” 77 'T’
The
charge that the British planned to instigate a slave and Indian insurrection in the colonies
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was completely erroneous, but the letter provoked hysteria throughout South Carolina
and provided the impetus for the formation of the Provincial Congress, which first met on
June 1. Weeks later a rum or circulated throughout Charleston that Gov. William
Campbell was aboard a sloop of war carrying 14,000 stands of arms to be used to arm the
slaves and Indians.78 Alexander Innes, Lord Dartm outh’s secret agent in Charleston,
reported that the letter “has raised a great ferment, and furnished the Committee with a
pretext to mount a Guard of 100 men every evening, with a Patrol of Horsemen.” The
Lee letter also provided the Provincial Congress with justification to raise 2,000 troops
and issue thousands of pounds of paper money. The letter also led to the exile of John
Stuart, the British Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department.
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Stuart’s deputy,

Alexander Cameron, remained behind.
The Whig propaganda machine fully exploited the letter. John Stuart and
Alexander Cameron had no desire to unleash the Indians on the southern colonies. They
crafted a “defensive Indian policy” attempted to secure the allegiance of the Indians
without involving them in the conflict. After Stuart fled the colony, his Charleston
mansion and his wife were held hostage by the Whig government. Stuart expressed
concern that the W higs would use the Indians to influence his behavior: “My wife is
detained in Charles Town, and has been insulted and threatened; and I have been
acquainted by the Committee that my estate is to answer for the behavior of the
Indians.”80 Stuart demonstrated remarkable transparency in order to prove he had no
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nefarious intentions. In a July 18 letter to the Committee of Intelligence, Stuart stated, “I
have never received any orders from my superiors, which by the most tortured
construction could be interpreted to spirit up or employ the Indians to fall upon the
frontier inhabitants, or to take part in the disputes between Great Britain and her
colonies.”81
Stuart’s subsequent talks with the Indians revealed his desire to keep them out of
the conflict. In a meeting with the Cherokees he declared, “There is a difference between
the people in England and the white people in America. This is a matter that does not
concern you; they will decide it between themselves.”

82

Stuart reiterated this point in a

talk with the Creeks: “There is an unhappy dispute between the people of England and
the white people of America, which, however, cannot affect you, as you can be supplied
from Mobile, Pensacola, and this place, where the people live like brothers and enjoy
peace; and it is not the intention of either party to hurt or molest you.”
Nevertheless, fears of an Indian attack persisted. The Whigs sent Major Andrew
Williamson to meet with Alexander Cameron and interrogate him about a February letter
written by Stuart that the Whigs interpreted as a plot to instigate the Indians. Williamson
recorded notes of his conversation with Cameron in which the deputy Indian
superintendent gave “the strongest assurances that he did not understand John Stuart’s
letter to him in February to incite the Cherokee’s to attack the Province.” Cameron
defended Stuart, asserting that he intended to keep the Indians “firmly attached to His
M ajesty’s government.” Cameron insisted that in the event of receiving such orders, he
O I
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would ignore them in order to protect defenseless women and children. Cameron further
added, “God forbid that he should be so void of humanity as to bring the Indians on this
Province.”84
The Indians had good reason to remain loyal to the crown. The British had made
an effort to slow westward expansion. Both Stuart and Cameron were full members of
Indian society; Stuart had even fathered a few children by Cherokee women. Cameron
had so much faith in the Cherokees, he wrote, “The Cherokees are the most faithful
Indians on the main. They would die, all hands, in my defense.”85 Despite the strong
attachment, Stuart struggled to control the Indians. Due to back-settlers’ encroachment on
Indian hunting grounds, the Cherokees had unleashed a devastating war in 1759.
Nonetheless, settlers continued to move west and often duped the Indians into selling
their land. Stuart recognized the danger of these transactions: “You [the Cherokees] have
been constantly told and admonished by me, not to treat or bargain for your land with any
person but m e.” The Cherokees had sold their land independently to Richard Pearis, a
Whig Indian trader, who, Stuart warned, “cheats you of your land.”86 These land sales
threatened to spark conflict between the Indians and settlers and to allow the Whigs to
point to the attacks as a British conspiracy.
After evicting Stuart from the colony, the Whigs worked to undermine British
relations with the Indians by dispatching agents of their own. George Galphin, a
prominent Indian trader, was commissioned by the Continental Congress as an Indian
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superintendent and dispatched to the Creeks. The Whigs adopted a strategy of divide and
conquer. The consequences of having all Indian tribes in the area unite against the
colony were frightening. With Stuart and Cameron commanding the respect and
admiration of the Cherokees and Creeks, their apprehension was reasonable. Stuart had
stoked these fears when he settled a war between the Creeks and Choctaws in early 1776,
freeing up Creek forces for a potential attack on the colonies.

0 7

With these fears in mind, Galphin worked to wean the Creeks away from the
British through gifts of gunpowder. He reported, “If we could supply the Creeks with
ammunition and goods it would not be in Mr. Stuart’s power to influence them to act
against us.”

00

Galphin was ultimately successful; when the loyalists attempted to send

wagons of powder to the Cherokees, the Creeks refused to allow the convoy to pass
through their territory.89
However, donations of powder to Indian nations, while it was in short supply in
the colonies, nearly sparked a backlash from back-settlers. The Provincial Congress sent
the Cherokees a gift of powder in November 1775, but en route a force led by Patrick
Cunningham and Jacob Bowman, two loyalist leaders, intercepted the wagon train.
Loyalists used the capture of the powder to their advantage, accusing the Whig
government of fomenting an Indian attack against all those who opposed their rule. In
response, Drayton composed a formal declaration explaining to the people of South
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Carolina the need to supply the Cherokees with powder. He defended the decision by
arguing that:
Experience has taught us, that occasional presents to the Indians has been
the great means of acquiring their friendship. . . . it clearly and
unfortunately appeared, that a general Indian war was inevitable, unless
the Indians were furnished with some small supplies of ammunition, to
enable them to procure deer skins for their support and maintenance.90
Drayton castigated some non-associators for making the issue of powder “an instrument
for their most diabolical purposes.” In attempts to appease other non-associators, Drayton
described the actions of the Whig government as “breathing equal benevolence to the
associators and non-associators in this Colony” by keeping the Indians at peace and
therefore providing universal protection. Though he acknowledged the scarcity of
gunpowder, Drayton argued that by giving the Indians a gift and keeping them at peace,
the colony would conserve gunpowder by avoiding a full-scale war. 91
Drayton’s reasoning had good effect. Although the Whig plot to sell powder to
the Indians had been exposed, settlers continued to remain distrustful of Alexander
Cameron, despite his efforts to promote Indian neutrality. M ajor Andrew Williamson
described the sentiment in the Ninety-Six district: “I was not a little surprised at my
arrival here to find the most material transactions of the Congress in the mouths of every
person, and to be told that there was an intention to seize Mr. Cameron, which occasioned
O'y

his going to the [Cherokee] Nation.” “ News of Cameron’s presence among the
Cherokees did not help his efforts to convince the back-settlers that the British meant no
harm. Drayton wrote to Cameron asking him to follow Stuart’s precedent by leaving the
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province; Cameron could not disobey the request “with safety to your person and the
people m your charge.”
Suspicion over Cam eron’s activities grew when the Whigs received an affidavit
detailing alleged plans for an Indian attack. A patriot named Jonathan Clark testified that
John Garwick, a close friend of Cameron, had warned him to flee to safety if troubles
escalated between the colonists and the king’s army. Garwick told Clark of a meeting
Cameron had with four hundred Cherokee in which he described how the rebels had
killed the king’s troops at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. The Cherokee replied
they would fight but complained of a lack of powder; Cameron assured them he would
supply them with the necessary tools of war.94
Though Cameron and Stuart pursued a “defensive” Indian policy, other leading
loyalists drew up plans designed to use Indians against the Whigs. Gov. Patrick Tonyn of
East Florida, Thomas Brown, and Gen. Thomas Gage sought to crush the rebellion by
enlisting the aid of Indians. On October 2, 1775, Gage wrote to John Stuart asking him
“to make them [Indians] take Arms against His M ajesty’s Enemies and to distress them
all in their power, . . . no time should be lost to distress a set of People so wantonly
rebellious.”95 Stuart, however, disagreed. Before he received Gage’s orders, Stuart had
written to the general stating “a great majority of the frontiers, and back inhabitants of
Carolina are attached to and inclined to support government. In such circumstances, I
conceive that an indiscriminate attack, by Indians, would be contrary to your
Excellency’s idea, and might do much harm.” Though Stuart had no delusions of
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bringing the entire Indian population down upon the back-settlers, given the increasingly
stiff opposition posed by the W higs, he did acquiesce (rather ambiguously) to disposing
“them to join in executing any concerted plan, and to act with, and assist, their well
disposed neighbors.”96
In the aftermath of the Snow Campaign, former loyalists were under intense Whig
scrutiny. Thomas Brown believed that the only way loyalists would rise again was with
the help of the Indians. Brown concocted a plan in which “trusted white m en” would
accompany the Indians during their attacks on small forts throughout the backcountry in
order to distinguish between friend and foe. Brown hoped that by seizing these forts,
loyalist and Indian forces would cut Whig supply lines to the backcountry.
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At the end of February 1776, John Stuart left St. Augustine for Cape Fear, North
Carolina to meet with Sir Henry Clinton to discuss a plan for using the Indians in the
event of a British invasion. However, Stuart did not convey Brown’s militant plan to
Clinton. A letter from Clinton to Governor Tonyn revealed that Stuart only told Clinton
of another of Brow n’s proposal to raise four companies of riflemen, not his plan to have
98

Indians fight alongside loyalists. L
In the summer of 1776, the Whig government pre-empted any efforts by the
British to enlist the Indians by sacking the Cherokees. Drayton gave specific orders to
decimate the Cherokees:
And now a word to the wise. It is expected you make smooth work as you
go - that is, you cut up every Indian corn-field, and bum every Indian
town - and that every Indian taken shall be the slave and property of the
taker; that the nation be extirpated, and the lands become the property of
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the public. For my part, I shall never give my voice for a peace with the
Cherokee Nation upon any other terms than their removal beyond the
mountains. 99
The demoralizing attack on the Cherokees intimidated other nations into staying out of
the conflict. M ajor Andrew Williamson received word from George Galphin that “the
Creeks are fully determined not to assist the Cherokees in the present war.” Williamson
expressed hope that the attack on the Cherokees “will deter any other nation, or tribes of
Indians,” from “disturbing the quiet of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, or this province
for some time to come.” 100 By employing the resources of the government to eradicate
the Indian threat, Drayton and his fellow Whigs helped to build public support for the
revolutionary cause. The loyalist leadership had collapsed six months before the W higs
attacked the Cherokees. The Whigs already had a firm grasp on the backcountry because
of their intimidation tactics, but neutralizing the Indians and opening up new lands for
settlement asserted the pre-war interests of the back-settlers.
The British did more harm than good to their cause by drawing up plans to use
Indians against the Whigs. During the summer of 1776, Cherokees killed loyalists
without distinction, revealing the fallacy of Brown’s plan.101 John Stuart and Alexander
Cameron may have had no intention of deploying the Indians against the Whig regime,
but their intentions mattered not. Fear of Indian attack had existed since the Cherokee
W ar of 1759 and was the number one issue on the minds of back-settlers. Cameron’s
presence among the Cherokees was no doubt suspicious to those who had experienced
the wrath of Indian attacks in the past. The Whigs were masterful propagandists; they
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exploited Arthur Lee’s letter to the fullest. The British provided no tangible evidence that
they were defending the backcountry from Indian attack. Conversely, the Whigs raised a
militia and took the war to the Indians, ensuring the protection of the back-settlers and
winning their favor in the process. The sentiment of back-settlers, and the crucial role
protection from Indian attack played in determining their allegiance was best described in
the account of Alexander Chesney. Although Chesney, a loyalist, was arrested by the
Whigs, imprisoned, forced to join the rebel army, and his house ransacked, and, he wrote,
“We marched against the Indians, to which I had no objection, helped to destroy 32 of
their towns. . . .” [my emphasis].
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CONCLUSION

In December 1775, Lord George Germain wrote to Major General Henry Clinton,
assistant to General W illiam Howe, with encouraging news regarding the rebellion in the
southern colonies. Germain announced that “The number of well-affected persons there
who, unprepared to resist, have been compelled to submit to the violence of the times is
certainly very great, and therefore there is the fairest prospect of that province being
reduced to obedience without any considerable difficulty or hazard...” ‘ Little did
Germain know that as his letter sailed across the Atlantic, the friends of government who
had taken up arms against W hig oppression were in the process of being soundly defeated
by Col. Richard Richardson and his army of 4,000-5,000 men in the Snow Campaign.
Nevertheless, the British began to conceive of an assault on the southern colonies in
hopes of using individuals loyal to the crown to crush the rebels.
In the early months of 1776, General Howe was preparing for a massive assault
on New York City. The campaign to destroy the Continental Army in New York was the
largest military engagement ever waged by the British military and required all available
resources. Yet the British high command saw an opportunity to achieve victory on the
cheap. Reports from the governors of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia
had communicated the expectation that the rebellion was the work of a minority and that
I 0T
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if aided by the British, loyalists would rise up and crush the Whig regimes. Over H ow e’s
opposition, General Clinton, accompanied by Admiral Sir Peter Parker, was dispatched to
rendezvous with loyalists in the southern colonies, quickly establish royal government,
and return in time for the assault on New York. The plan was flawed in its conception
and tragic in its execution. As historian Paul Smith wrote in his study of British loyalist
policy:
The plan clearly envisioned only token opposition by rebel forces. No
allowance was made for the possibility that the loyalists might be
intimidated and rendered ineffective, no provision was made for any rebel
resurgence once the British regulars had been withdrawn, and no warrants
were issued for raising regular provincial regiments for later use by the
colonial governors.104
Clinton and Parker arrived at Cape Fear, North Carolina on March 12, 1776 only
to learn that the friends of government that were so integral to their operation had been
defeated at the Battle of M oore’s Creek Bridge on February 27 after taking up arms
prematurely. Their defeat had been the result of poor communication and choppy seas.
Clinton’s ships had been delayed by winter storms and a detachment of troops sailing
from Ireland never arrived. W ithout a chance to conquer North Carolina, Clinton turned
his attention to South Carolina. Clinton had received intelligence that the loyalists were
confined to the backcountry, but without the reinforcements from Ireland, Clinton was
too short-handed to make an assault that would reach the backcountry. With his ships
anchored outside of Charleston, Clinton devised a light naval assault on the city. Rather
than sack the capital, he sought to seize Sullivan’s Island to create a temporary asylum
for loyalists and royal officials “until the proper season for a southern American

104 Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture, 1964), 22-23.
49

campaign returned.” 105 Though the attack was not designed to overthrow the W hig
regime, Clinton believed that a future southern campaign was inevitable and thus saw
value in establishing a friendly outpost. W ithout providing details on how the outpost
would be supplied or defended, Clinton commenced his attack. Three ships ran aground
as they attempted to fire on Fort Moultrie and Clinton’s ground forces were unable to
reach Sullivan’s island due to impassible terrain and heavy fire. The subsequent British
retreat provided the W higs with a resounding boost of m orale.106
The British acted too late to save royal government in South Carolina. The Whig
government’s use of intimidation and violence rooted out any staunch loyalist opposition
i
and sidelined thousands of potential supporters of the crown. W hile the need for such
oppressive tactics demonstrates backcountry antagonism to the independence movement,
becoming an active loyalist required individuals to pick up a musket and fight their
fellow colonists. W ithout the protection of the British, few were willing to jeopardize
their lives and property in a losing cause. Thomas Brown wrote, “The Reduction of this
Province. . . we can easily at any time effect when ever your Lordship shall be pleased to
give Orders for the Purpose but until the arrival of some Troops either in the Province of
North Carolina or this to cause a Diversion in our Favor we are of Opinion it would be an
Experiment rather too hazardous.” 107 Protection was a prerequisite for action.
Part of the problem the opponents of independence faced was a Jack of
gunpowder. Governor Campbell acknowledged the futility of resistance when he noted,
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“as they [back-settlers] have neither proper arms nor ammunition it would be the greatest
cruelty as well as the highest madness to expose them to the fury of the rebels.”

108

Regardless of how much anger Drayton stirred up through his threats of burning houses
and sacking property, opposition forces remained powerless against a Whig government
in control of the colony’s militia and resources. In April 1775, men friendly to the Whig
government raided numerous armories throughout Charleston and the lowcountry, seizing
hundreds of weapons and thousands of pounds of powder. Lt. Gov. William Bull
reported, “There is not now a pound of gunpowder in the public magazine.” Replacing
the stolen powder was nearly impossible. Since the escalation of tensions between the
colonists and the mother country, the king prohibited the exportation of gunpowder to the
colonies. 109 But the W higs managed to procure additional muskets and powder from
French and Dutch smugglers. They also outfitted a number of privateer boats to raid
British ships stationed in the harbor; by August 1775, they had stolen over twenty tons of
pow der.110
The lack of powder for the individual back-settler failed to stoke the fires of
resistance. Moses Kirkland, a bitter enemy of Drayton and loyalist ring-leader, reported
that “the backsettlers are two to one in number, more than the rebel party; they got some
powder, but when it came to be divided, they had only two rounds a man.” 111 A
numerical advantage in manpower was useless without enough powder. On November
25, 1775, the Provincial Congress ordered one Edward Weyman to collect any
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gunpowder still in private hands and to deposit it in the public magazine, thereby
centralizing it and removing it from loyalist reach.112 Following the Snow Campaign, the
Whigs solidified their authority as the Provincial Congress resolved to disarm all those
who “shall be active in opposing the measures of the Continental or Colony Congress.”
Those who had fought against Col. Richard Richardson’s forces in the Snow Campaign
were pardoned and were “allowed to trade as usual, except for arms and ammunition.”
Only by convincing the committee of their loyalty to the American cause and through an
oath could their arms be restored to them. 113 Opposition to the Whig government led to
disarmament. The consequences of disarmament were further amplified by the fact that
the Indian threat did not subside until late 1776. Although no concrete evidence exists to
prove that back-settlers signed the Association in order to keep their arms to defend
themselves against the Cherokees and Creeks, the thought could not have been far from
their minds.
Fear was the main reason unknown numbers of back-settlers signed the
Association. But fear did not produce loyal subjects. Governor Campbell noted in a letter
to Lord Dartmouth that “the boasted unanimity is notoriously false, very many who were
obliged to sign the Association totally disapprove every measure they have taken, and if
things come to the last extremity they will find themselves abandoned by numbers whom
fear or interest reduced to join them .” 114 One back-settler who reluctantly signed the
Association attested, “I know many whose hearts revolted while they put their hands to it,
and I have heard them declare that they submitted to this illegal power as they would to a
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highwayman who held a pistol to their breasts; some few, notwithstanding the terror held
over their heads, when they signed it, added saving their allegiance to His M ajesty.” 115
Historian John Gordon argued in his military history of the Revolution in South Carolina
that at the early stages of the war (1775-1776), both W higs and loyalists displayed
remarkable restraint on the battlefield. Despite all the threats and confrontations, only a
handful of men died as a result of the tension between patriots and loyalists in 1775.
However, when the British invaded in 1780, blood flowed in every town in the
backcountry.116 Partisan warfare laid waste to the South Carolina backcountry as cowed
associators and staunch non-associators (who had since been exiled from the colony) rose
under the protection of British redcoats to seek both protection and revenge for their
maltreatment. In the fog of war, as British troops failed to protect every neighborhood
and as patriot militias roamed free, allegiances swayed with the wind. Young loyalists
like Alexander Chesney joined the rebel army to “save my father’s family from
threatened ruin.” 117 The spirited Eliza Wilkinson, a young girl who witnessed the British
occupation, wrote, “I fear principle governs few. Interest reigns predominant.”
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As

historian Robert Lambert noted, many people in the backcountry tended to change
loyalties three to four times during the w ar.119 Such vacillating proves that individuals
were not loyal to a single ideology, but rather chose the side that offered the greatest
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degree of protection. But one other factor that has not yet been considered is self-interest.
As Eliza Wilkinson said, “Interest reigns predominant.”
The Whig government was not shy about using economic incentives to influence
peoples’ allegiance. In an effort to undermine the authority of militia colonel Thomas
Fletchall, a man unfriendly to the patriots, the Council of Safety permitted open trade
with FletchalTs men to try to lure them away from their commander.
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If trade did not

work to bring FletchalTs men over to the patriots, the Whigs were not beneath purchasing
their loyalty. Col. Richard Richardson, a prominent backcountry militia commander
recommended that “If our present expedition should fail that is now detached, we shall
yet have these principals, as money will often accomplish what force cannot.” 121
While money served as motivation to join the rank and file, the promise of
improved status through commissions attracted the local elite to the Whigs. In a letter to
Henry Laurens, Thomas Fletchall affirmed the importance of officer commissions in
determining the allegiance of men when he wrote, “As for my commissions, I care not
who has them; a man that is to be bought by a commission is not worthy of one, although
that is the price of many.” 122 Thomas Brown, the Georgian who had been beaten by a
W hig mob, proclaimed, “A Profusion of Promises and Commissions were dealt out with
a liberal hand together with some Bribes to procure a Subscription to the
Association.” 123W hile the British also actively courted the local elite, the collapse of
royal government hamstrung their efforts to match the incentives provided by the Whigs.

120 Drayton to Council of Safety, September 17, 1775, in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 189
1“l Richardson to Laurens, December 22, 1775, in ibid., 243.
122 Fletchall to Laurens, July 24, 1775, in ibid., 124.
123 “Loyalist View of Drayton-Tennent-Hart M ission,” 18.
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W hen ideological fervor for independence did not draw individuals to the Whig camp,
the prospect of improved social status did.
Enticing recruits with money and promises of greater clout within their
communities does not always produce the most loyal soldiers, however. In August 1775,
a mutiny occurred in the W hig militia. Drayton reported that “the men were in an uproar
at the idea of a deduction of their pay, for they had in general been promised provisions
above their pay, and they were determined to quit the camp this morning and disband.” 324
Drayton quelled the mutiny by allowing the enlisted men to purchase surplus goods from
local residents and by ordering their commander to construct higher quality huts for their
shelter.125
Andrew Williamson accepted a commission as a major during 1775 and was well
known within the backcountry for his efforts to neutralize the threat posed by loyalists
and Indians. Yet, in 1780, after the fall of Charleston, Williamson took an oath of
allegiance to the British in order to protect his property. He became known as the
“Arnold” of Carolina.126 Williamson was not alone. Moses Kirkland, one of the most
vehement loyalists who plagued Drayton throughout 1775, had received a commission
from the Council of Safety earlier that year. In July, the Council of Safety dispatched
Kirkland and Major James Mayson to Fort Charlotte to secure a supply of gunpowder,
but Kirkland switched sides during the mission and delivered the powder to a group of
loyalists at Ninety-Six. The consensus among scholars is that Kirkland acted out of
jealousy; he was angered that he had been passed over for a major’s commission in favor

124 Drayton to Tennent, Aug. 7, 1775 in Gibbes, Doc. Hist., 128-131.
125 Krawczynski, Drayton, 165.
126 “Journal of Alexander Chesney,” 40.
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of M ayson.127 Later in the war, Kirkland nearly walked away from the cause when his
rival, Robert Cunningham, was awarded the commission he desired. 128 These blatant acts
of self-interest demonstrated a lack of ideological attachment.
***********
In hindsight, the inability of the British to provide protection against the measures
of the W hig government in 1775 and 1776 destroyed any possibility of establishing royal
government in the southern colonies. As Sir Henry Clinton noted:
The alarm which was now excited among loyalists by the large
detachments sent off from the army called forth my utmost exertions to
ease their minds, by convincing them that a total evacuation of the British
posts was not intended. For I readily saw that the very worst consequences
were to be apprehended from such an idea laying hold of them. . . . Should
they, therefore, happen to be shaken in the confidence they had of support
from her [Great Britain], policy might point out to many of them the
prudence of early making the best peace they could with the usurpers.
And, when that dangerous door was once opened, it was impossible to
foretell where the defection might stop, or how soon the entire alienation
of America might follow. 129
Clinton prophesized correctly. His 1776 attack on Sullivan’s Island failed to provide any
assistance or protection for the backcountry friends of government. After neutralizing the
loyalist opposition in the backcountry, the Whig government solidified its authority and
won favor with many back-inhabitants by attacking and decimating the Cherokees,
thereby opening up more land for settlement. The Whigs also pardoned any insurgents
who had taken up arms against them as long as they promised to live in peace. The
disestablishment of the Anglican Church and greater representation in the state assembly
aided the W higs in their efforts to maintain the peace among the back-settlers. These
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Krawczynski, Drayton, 158.
| 70
Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 153.
129 Willcox, Sir Henry Clinton ’s Narrative, 109.
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measures helped to dull the bitterness and animosity that had plagued the colony prior to
independence. Men were permitted to return to their private pursuits.
The Whigs also took a hard-line approach to prevent future disturbances by
exiling any remaining loyalists who refused to sign the Association with a guarantee of
death if they ever returned. A sedition law promised to punish by death anyone who took
“up arms with a hostile intent, and by force and violence, or by words, deeds or writing”
tried to rally others, or communicated with or assisted the British in efforts to incite an
Indian or slave rebellion.130 After 1775, back-settlers, as Clinton said, made “peace with
the usurpers.” This “peace” undermined British efforts to rally the backcountry in 1780
when the British failed yet again to provide back-settlers the protection they needed to
declare their allegiance to the crown.
The struggle to control the backcountry in 1775 and the bloodbath that broke out
in 1780 in South Carolina are all the more striking when compared to the experiences of
back-settlers in Virginia. In terms of ethnic, religious, and economic factors, the Virginia
backcountry had more in common with the South Carolina backcountry than in contrast.
A plethora of ethnic groups settled in pockets throughout the Virginia Southside and
Shenandoah Valley. Evangelicals threatened the established Anglican order. Neither
backcountry cultivated staple crops and thus had similar social orders. Yet domestic strife
and civil war did not plague Virginia. The reason for V irginia’s remarkable stability is
political. From the beginning of settlement, the tidewater elite took steps to integrate the
backcountry into the existing political structure. Backcountry counties like Lunenburg
sent representatives to the House of Burgesses and enjoyed the benefits of having local

L'° Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 50.
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institutions of government such as the county court.
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In South Carolina, the back-

inhabitants were left without essential government institutions and a political voice to
rectify the problem. Following the Regulator movement, greater steps were taken to
correct the neglect, but the backcountry remained a distinct society with interests that did
not include revolution.
*********
The South Carolina backcountry, like its neighboring backcountries in other colonies,
did not possess a deferential social order. Even if it had, would it have had any influence
on the events of 1775 and 1776? In a polarized society, drifting towards civil war, men
act in their own self-interest. If scholars question the strength of deference in peacetime,
they should reject outright the notion that men willingly deferred to their social superiors
in wartime. Robert Cunningham, Moses Kirkland, Thomas Brown, and countless other
prominent men in the South Carolina backcountry were respected by their neighbors. But
when faced with loss of property, economic restrictions, incarceration, or even death - all
threats to a m an’s independence - most back-settlers opted for the course of least
resistance. This course involved signing an Association. When threatened by militia and
hostile Indians, the decision to acquiesce to Whig rule was simple and had little to do
with deference. The case of John Champneys illustrates this point, Champneys had his
property seized by the Whigs when he refused to muster for his local militia. He was
taken into custody and jailed by the Whigs. As he slept one night, someone fired a

1,1 Richard Beeman, who published a case study of Lunenburg County, Virginia, wrote
an excellent piece comparing the experiences of the Virginia and South Carolina
backcountries entitled “The Political Response to Social Conflict in the Southern
Backcountry: A Comparative View of Virginia and the Carolinas during the Revolution,”
in Hoffman, An Uncivil War, 213-239.
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gunshot into his cell, narrowly missing him. Reflecting back on his experiences during
the war, Champneys epitomized the sentiments of thousands of back-settlers and helped
explain why the Whig government won control of the backcountry: “As protection and
allegiance are inseparable, we are desirous to enjoy the protection of our country, and
are satisfied to take the test of allegiance” [my em phasis].132

1,2 John Champneys, An account o f the sufferings and persecutions o f John Champneys,
a native o f Charles-town, South Carolina; inflicted by order o f Congress, fo r his refusal
to take up arms in defense o f the arbitrary proceedings carried on by the rulers o f said
place. Together with his protest, &c., (London, 1778).
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